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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Richard David Pokorney appeals from his convictions for lewd conduct.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
After a trial at which he represented himself, Pokorney was convicted of
five counts of lewd conduct with three of his five sons, but his conviction was
overturned on appeal. State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 235 P.3d 409 (Ct. App.
2010). While the matter was on appeal Pokorney moved to substitute the State
Appellate Public Defender for allegedly failing to communicate with him, failing to
procure transcripts Pokorney requested, failing to conduct discovery, and failing
to contend to the appellate court that Pokorney's conviction was a result of a
conspiracy between the prosecutor and public defender. (R., pp. 15-18.) The
district court denied the motion on the basis that any motion to substitute counsel
in the middle of an appeal should be made to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., p.
15.)
Pokorney made another motion to substitute appellate counsel the next
month, also denied by the trial court. (R., pp. 20-21.)
After the Idaho Court of Appeals had issued its decision in the case, but
before the remittitur issued, the trial court held a "Review Hearing after Appeal"
and re-appointed the public defender to represent Pokorney on remand. (R., pp.
25-26; 6/3/10 Tr., p. 5, L. 16 - p. 6, L. 6; Docket 34945 Remittitur.)
Thereafter Pokorney moved for "conflict counsel." (R., pp. 49-50; 8/12/10
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-15.) Pokorney claimed the conflict was, "obviously, ineffective
1

counsel, obstruction, denial of evidence, willful sabotage, on and on." (8/12/10
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-20.)

Pokorney specified that he wanted "a conflict attorney

outside of - [the J public defender's office." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.) The trial
court instructed Pokorney to write a "letter and outline all of the concerns or
problems you have ... and ... we will give you a hearing on it." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 9,
Ls. 2-11.) The court then set a hearing date eight days later. (8/12/10 Tr., p. 11,
Ls. 1-18.)
At the hearing the court inquired why Pokorney had not filed a letter.
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 4-12.) Pokorney represented he had the letter, but when
the court asked to see it Pokorney stated, "I withdraw that. I would like to just
assert my right to go on pro bono, or pro se." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 13-25.)
Pokorney then challenged the initial appointment of counsel. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 13,
L. 25 - p. 14, L. 11.)

The court engaged in a colloquy with Pokorney that

established Pokorney was without funds to hire his own attorney but wished to
proceed with representation. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 14, L. 12- p. 15, L. 10.)
In response to the court's questioning Pokorney clarified that he believed
there was a conflict with appointed counsel, Edward Odessey. (8/20/10 Tr., p.
15, Ls. 11-14.) The court asked Mr. Odessey if there was a conflict "in terms of
[his] ability to represent Mr. Pokorney as a zealous advocate on his behalf."
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 16-20.)

Mr. Odessey responded, "None at all, Your

Honor." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, L. 21.) The court then established through counsel
that discovery had been conducted, the case investigated, and that the Court of
Appeals had ultimately reversed the conviction by overruling the trial court's
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rejection of an objection Mr. Odessey made. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 16, L. 22 - p. 17, L.
11.)
Pokorney responded by claiming that Mr. Odessey had "lied to [him],
threatened [him]."

(8/20/10 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 18-23.)

Specifically, Pokorney

claimed Mr. Odessey had threatened to "make sure that [he] spent the rest of
[his] life in prison" if Pokorney continued a particular line of cross examination of
one of the victims while representing himself in the first trial. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18,
Ls. 1-9.) When asked by the court if he had made such a threat Mr. Odessey
stated he had not. (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 10-13.) The next "threat" was making
sure Pokorney had civilian clothes for the trial "eight months before trial and
without any kind of investigation." (8/20/10 Tr., p. 18, L. 16 - p. 19, L. 17.) Mr.
Odessey represented that was merely part of trial preparation. (8/20/10 Tr., p.
19, Ls. 18-22.)
Mr. Pokorney laughed out loud in court at the idea that having civilian
clothing for the trial was part of trial preparation instead of a threat. (8/20/10 Tr.,
p. 19, L. 23.) The trial court then expressed "grave concerns about [Pokorney's]
grasp of reality at this point in time" and ordered a competency evaluation.
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 20, L. 2 - p. 21, L. 11; R., pp. 60-61.)

The competency

evaluation, however, showed that Pokorney was not incompetent to proceed.
(9/24/10 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 4-12.)
In the meantime Pokorney submitted two letters, one dated August 17,
2010 and the other September 20, 2010. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 6, L. 17 - p. 7, L. 2.)
Mr. Odessey generally denied the allegations of inappropriate conduct or conflict
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of interests in the letters. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-15.) The court found there was
neither ineffective assistance of counsel nor a conflict of interest. (9/24/10 Tr., p.
9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) The court then inquired if Pokorney wished to proceed
without the services of appointed counsel and, when he indicated in the
affirmative, discharged the public defender. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 11, L. 2 - p. 12, L. 5;
see also p. 12, L. 8- p. 19. L. 23 (taking waiver of counsel).)
The matter proceeded to trial (R., pp. 112-26, 133-51 ), at the conclusion of
which the jury found Pokorney guilty of two counts of lewd conduct (R., pp. 19596). The district court entered judgment (R., pp. 370-72), from which Pokorney
timely appealed (R., pp. 374-76).

4

ISSUES
Pokorney states the issues on appeal as:
I.
WHETHER APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED
WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE
COUNSEL RESULTING IN MR. POKORNEY PROCEEDING PRO
SE, OR, IN THE LATERNATIVE, WHETHER THE COURT ERRED
BY FAILING TO HOLD A SUFFICIENT HEARING

II.
WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPORT
THE CONVICTIONS

111.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW
MR. POKORNEY TO RECALL AND IMPEACH WITNESSES
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Pokorney failed to show any error in the district court's denial of his
request for substitution of counsel?

2.

Has Pokorney failed to show that the evidence of his guilt is insufficient to
support his convictions?

3.

Has Pokorney failed to show trial error in the district court's refusal to
allow Pokorney to recall a state's witness in the state's case-in-chief to
conduct further cross-examination?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Pokorney Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Denial Of His
Request For Substitution Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Pokorney's request for substitution of counsel,

finding no ineffective assistance of counsel and no conflict of interests. (9/24/10
Tr., p. 9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) On appeal Pokorney claims that there was a conflict
of interest "due to an irrevocable breakdown of communication between the
attorney and the defendant." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Pokorney never claimed
such a breakdown before the trial court, however, and his factual assertions to
the trial court do not support any finding of such a breakdown. Pokorney next
complains that the trial court "deprived Mr. Pokorney of his full and fair
opportunity to present his complaints" about why substitute counsel should be
appointed.

(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) Review of the record shows the district

court granted more than ample opportunity for Pokorney to assert his grounds for
wanting substitute counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel for an indigent

defendant lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. I.C. § 19-856; State
v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715, 52 P.3d 857, 859-860 (2002); State v. Olayton,
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980). Credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the
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evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

Pokorney's Assertion That There Was An "Irrevocable Breakdown Of
Communication" Is Unsupported By The Record
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13

of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel, though not the right to
an appointed attorney of one's choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772
P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989). While the Sixth Amendment guarantees counsel
who "function[s] in the active role of an advocate," Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S.
748, 751 (1967), it does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an
accused and his counsel, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1983).
A trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an
indigent defendant for "good cause." I.C. § 19-856; State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho
896,897,606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711,713,946
P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997).

Mere lack of confidence in otherwise

competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729,
620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. Instead,
"good cause" for the appointment of substitute counsel generally requires either
"an

actual

conflict

of

interest;

a complete,

irrevocable

breakdown

of

communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust
verdict." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 856, 866, 181 P.3d 512, 522-523 (Ct. App.
2007) (citing Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991); McKee v.
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Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231,
1250 (10th Cir. 2002)).
On appeal Pokorney does not challenge the district court's findings that
there was neither ineffective assistance nor an actual conflict of interests.
Rather, he limits his claim of error to asserting that there was a total breakdown
in communication and that the trial court failed to give him ample opportunity to
present that claim.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-19.) Application of the law to the

facts shown by the record, however, shows that Pokorney never asserted to the
district court that there had been a breakdown of communication despite more
than generous opportunities to do so.
It is difficult for a defendant to show a "total breakdown in communication."
See United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1025 (10th Cir. 2009)
(recognizing the "defendant's burden" and holding that "without any evidence
precluding the possibility of mere strategic disagreement or suggesting such a
'total breakdown in communication,' we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion in denying [the defendant's] motions"); United States v. Doe, 272 F.3d
116, 122-126 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that a total breakdown in communication
had not occurred when the defendant made threats of physical violence to his
counsel and his counsel's family, and when he alleged that his defense counsel
had repeatedly lied to him, because while the rift between defendant and counsel
was "at times intense," defense counsel was able to carry out his duties and
some communication did take place); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 12761277 (9th Cir. 1998) (substitution of counsel not warranted where record showed
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counsel and defendant communicated, although defendant complained about
inadequate time meeting with counsel and counsel's "gloomy predictions"). A
defendant may not "manufacture good cause by abusive or uncooperative
behavior." State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, _ , 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App.
2012).
Factors in evaluating the "constitutional implications of a total breakdown
in communications include" (1) the timing of the motion, (2) the adequacy of the
trial court's inquiry, (3) whether the conflict between counsel and his client was
"so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate
defense," and (4) whether the defendant "substantially and unreasonably
contributed" to the breakdown. Lippert, 152 Idaho at_, 276 P.3d at 759.
Pokorney's appellate argument notwithstanding, in this case there was no
"total breakdown in communications."
breakdown in communications.

In fact, Pokorney never claimed any

Pokorney did claim his attorney was an

"arrogant, obstructive, colluding, prosecutorial sycophant" and accused him of
"willful malefic behavior."

(8/17/10 Letter, p. 1.)

He listed many things he

believed his attorney should have done differently in relation to the first trial. (Id.
at pp. 1-2; 9/20/10 Letter, pp. 4-5.)

He called his attorney a liar and "long-

winded, puffed up and lame." (8/17/10 Letter, pp. 3-4.) He accused him of being
"on the heels and at the service of the prosecutor and judge ... a turncoat of the
most despicable kind." (Id. at p. 4.) He went on at length about his theories of
the case and accused his counsel of "abetting" the victims' false testimony. (Id.
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at 5-6; 9/20/10 Letter, pp. 5-9.) He asserted he could not "trust" his counsel "or,
by extension, the Ada County Public Defender's Office." (8/17/10 Letter, p. 7.)
At the hearings Pokorney claimed the reason he wished substitution of
counsel was "ineffective counsel, obstruction, denial of evidence, willful
sabotage, on and on." (8/12/10 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-20.) Pokorney claimed counsel
had lied to him and threatened him, giving such examples as pointing out that he
could spend the rest of his life in prison and procuring civilian clothes for the trial.
(8/20/10 Tr., p. 17, L. 18-p. 20, L. 1.)
Tellingly absent from all of Pokorney's allegations is any claim that his
counsel was not communicating with him. (See also Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16
(detailing Pokorney's allegations without mentioning lack of communication).)
Because there was no claim of a total breakdown in communication to the trial
court, Pokorney has failed to show that the district court erred in not finding one.
Applying the four factors set forth in the law also shows no grounds for
substitution of counsel. (1) Pokorney did timely assert his claim for substitution
of counsel, but at no time prior to the appeal did he claim a breakdown in
communications. (2) As will be more thoroughly addressed below, the trial court
gave Pokorney ample opportunity to assert his grounds for desiring a substitution
of counsel. (3) Although Pokorney made several claims of why he did not have
confidence in his counsel's ability to secure him a fair trial, lack of communication
was not among them.

(4) To the extent there was any breakdown in

commun_ication, Pokorney's conduct was the sole cause. These factors show no
good cause for substitution of counsel.
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Finally, Pokorney bases a large part of his appellate argument on the
district court's later comment that "taking every bit [of Pokorney's letters] as true,
I cannot find there is a basis to remove Mr. Odessey." (Appellant's brief, pp. 1416; 9/24/10 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 17-20.)
ground for denying the motion.

This statement is, at best, an alternative
Pokorney does not challenge the primary

grounds for denying the motion; the district court's findings that "Mr. Odessey
does not have a conflict in representing Mr. Pokorney in future proceedings" and
that counsel had been effective when representing Pokorney in prior proceedings
in the case. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 9, L. 16 - p. 11, L. 1.) Because those findings are
unchallenged on appeal, and because the record does not support any claim of a
"total breakdown in communications," Pokorney has failed to show an abuse of
discretion in the denial of his request for substitution of counsel.

D.

The District Court Gave Pokorney A Full And Fair Opportunity To
Establish The Bases For His Request For Substitution Of Counsel
The trial court must afford the defendant a full and far opportunity to

present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel.
State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980). Review of
the record shows that the district court fully complied with this requirement.
When Pokorney initially raised the issue the district court instructed him to
write out his reasons and submit them to the court. (R., pp. 49-50; 8/12/1 O Tr., p.
8, Ls. 14-24; p. 9, Ls. 2-11.) Thereafter the district court considered two letters
by Pokorney and held two hearings on the request. (See generally 8/20/10 Tr.;
9/24/10 Tr.; 8/17/10 letter; 9/20/10 letter.)
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Soliciting written statements and

holding two hearings on the issue was more than enough for the district court to
be made aware of the nature and merit of Pokorney's claims.
Pokorney claims the court erred by not granting him an opportunity to
"discuss" his written allegations. (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) The court did invite
him to present any "additional allegations" not in the letters. (9/24/10 Tr., p. 8, L.
22 - p. 9, L. 4.) Pokorney has cited no legal authority for the proposition that a
defendant must be given a chance to "discuss" detailed factual allegations
provided to the court in writing and has asserted no argument that his letters
were deficient in conveying the substance of his claims to the court.

He has

therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion by the district court.

II.
The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support The Convictions

A.

Introduction
Pokorney claims the evidence at his trial was insufficient to show sexual

intent.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-27.)

Sexual intent was, however, a proper

inference drawn by the jury from the evidence in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review,
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the
12

credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, the
facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of
upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho
at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

C.

The Evidence Was Sufficient To Create The Inference Of Sexual Intent
Lewd conduct consists of any lewd or lascivious act upon the body of a

child "done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or
passions or sexual desires" of the defendant, the victim or a third party. I.C. §
18-1508. It is well established that a jury may infer intent from the doing of the
proscribed act. State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 24, 592 P.2d 836, 839 (1979);
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Marsh, 141 Idaho 862,867, 119 P.3d 637,642 (Ct. App. 2004).
The information charged Pokorney with having genital to genital contact
with R.P. (Count II) and manual to genital contact with W.P. (Count V). (#34945
R., pp. 8-10.)

R.P. testified that Pokorney rubbed his erect penis on R.P.'s

genitals. (Trial Tr., p. 189, L. 15 - p. 193, L. 15.) W.P. testified that Pokorney
fondled W.P.'s testicles and penis with his hands. (Trial Tr., p. 211, L. 21 - p.
221, L. 15.) This evidence supports the reasonable inference that the touching
was with sexual intent, and this Court cannot substitute its own inferences for
those necessarily drawn by the jury.
13

111.
Pokorney Has Failed To Show Trial Error In The District Court's Denial Of A
Request To Recall A State's Witness During The State's Case-In-Chief For
Further Cross-Examination
A.

Introduction
At the conclusion of Pokorney's cross-examination of R.P., Pokorney

indicated a desire to "recall [him] tomorrow." (Trial Tr., p. 202, Ls. 23-24.) The
trial court indicated it would "take it up accordingly" and that it would "make a
determination" whether to excuse the witness. (Trial Tr., p. 202, L. 25 - p. 203, L.
7.) The district court also stated, however, "If you wish to call him in your case in
chief tomorrow, he'll be allowed to testify." (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 6-9.) The next
day, still during the state's case-in-chief, the district court informed Pokorney that
it would not allow him to call R.P. back to the stand for impeachment purposes,
but would allow greater "latitude" in relation to the older victims. (Trial Tr., p. 287,
L. 7 - p. 291, L. 10.) The court made no ruling at that time on whether Pokorney

could call any witness in his own case-in-chief.
Later that day the state rested and Pokorney began the presentation of his
defense case-in-chief. (Trial Tr., p. 479, Ls. 6-7; p. 481, Ls. 6-8.) After the first
defense witness the trial court asked Pokorney if he had any other witnesses and
the defense rested. (Trial Tr., p. 490, Ls. 3-5.)
Pokorney contends the district court erred by not allowing him to recall a
state's witness for further cross-examination during the state's case-in-chief
because the district court applied a rule of civil procedure and because, he
claims, the ruling deprived him of his right to confront his accusers and present a
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complete defense. (Appellant's brief, p. 27.) This argument fails because the
district court has general authority to control the order and presentation of
witnesses in a criminal case as well as in a civil one and because Pokorney has
failed to show any constitutional violation arising from the court's ruling.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion. State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The
constitutionality of the trial court's decision excluding evidence is also reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-15, 839 P.2d 1223,
1228-29 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

Pokorney's Claim That The Trial Court Erred By Citing A Rule Of Civil
Procedure Is Meritless
Pokorney claims the district court erred by not allowing him to recall a

state's witness for additional cross-examination during the state's case-in-chief
because the district court relied upon a rule of civil procedure as its authority for
controlling the order of presentation of witnesses. He does not claim, however,
that the court lacks such authority in a criminal case, only that it cited the wrong
rule.

It is established in criminal cases that "[t]he order of presentation of

witnesses is an administrative decision within the discretion of the trial court."
State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 729, 979 P.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing
I.R.E. 611 (a)). Because Pokorney has failed to establish that the district court
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lacked the authority to control the order of presentation of witnesses in a criminal
case, his claim of error is without merit.

D.

Pokorney Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His
Constitutional Right To Present Evidence In His Own Defense
A defendant has a general right, rooted in the Compulsory Process or

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to offer testimony of witnesses, to compel their
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts.

~.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho
236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009). This constitutional guarantee, however, does not
afford a criminal defendant a right to present irrelevant evidence. Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469,
1473 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718,722, 85 P.3d 1117, 1121 (Ct.
App. 2003); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 956-57, 231 P.3d 1047, 1053-54 (Ct.
App. 2010).
Even relevant evidence may be excluded in certain circumstances. State
v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 814-15, 839 P.2d 1223, 1228-29 (Ct. App. 1992).
Indeed, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, trial courts retain wide
latitude under the rules of evidence to limit a criminal defendant's ability to
present evidence. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); State v. Perry. 139
Idaho 520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973)) ("With the exercise of the defendant's right to present
evidence, the rules of procedure and evidence must be complied with to assure
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both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt or innocence.").

For

example, "trial judges retain wide latitude" to reasonably limit a criminal
defendant's right to cross-examine a witness "based on concerns about, among
others, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
at 679.
The determination of whether a defendant's rights have been violated by
the exclusion of evidence at trial requires a two-part inquiry:
First, the trial court must consider whether the evidence proffered is
relevant. If it is not relevant, the defendant has no constitutional
right to present it. If the evidence is relevant, the trial court must
ask whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's
interest in presenting the evidence. . . . [B]ecause the trial courts
have such broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect
or other concerns outweigh the probative value of the evidence, a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right[s] will only [be held to have
been] violated if [the appellate court] concludes that the trial court
abused its discretion.
Self, 139 Idaho at 722, 85 P.3d at 1121 (citing Peite, 122 Idaho at 814-15, 839
P.2d at 1228-29).
The record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Pokorney's only stated basis for wanting to recall the witness for further crossexamination was that he "didn't have the material with [him]" when he crossexamined the witness. (Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 18-19.) In denying the request the
trial court concluded that did not justify allowing the victim "to be retraumatized
again."

(Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 20-21.)

The court concluded its ruling stating:

"[B]efore he's even recalled to the witness stand, you're going to outline to me
what it is that you're going to ask him. And if it's about prior inconsistent
17

statements [by R.P.], who has been traumatized twice already, I am not going to
give you the right to do that by recalling him. You had the opportunity to do that
when he was on the witness stand in the first place." (Trial Tr., p. 290, L. 21 - p.
291, L. 6.)
The record supports the district court's analysis. Pokorney was given the
opportunity to cross examine R.P. (Trial Tr., p. 197, L. 10 - p. 202, L. 22.) When
Pokorney indicated that he wished to recall R.P. the court promised only that it
would take that issue up at that time. (Trial Tr., p. 202, L. 23 - p. 203, L. 7.) The
court did tell Pokorney that he could call R.P in his defense case. (Trial Tr., p.
203, Ls. 7-9.) While it appears from the record that Pokorney may not have
understood that calling R.P. in his own case-in-chief would not at that time allow
him to cross-examine R.P. about his direct testimony (Trial Tr., p. 203, Ls. 4-11;
p. 287, L. 22 - p. 291, L. 10), Pokorney cannot rely upon his ignorance of the
proper procedure for cross-examination and direct examination to show error.
See Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, _ , 275 P.3d 857, 861
(2012) ("Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those
represented by an attorney."). Because Pokorney did have the opportunity for
cross-examination, and his only excuse for not completing his cross-examination
was that he did not "have the material" with him to conduct his crossexamination, he has failed to show that the district court erred by denying his
request to re-call R.P. during the state's case for additional cross-examination.
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E.

Any Error Was Harmless
Even if the court erred, the error was harmless.

"Error may not be

predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the
challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the burden of demonstrating that
an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).
First, because the district court's ruling was limited to recalling R.P. (Trial
Tr., p. 290, L. 18 - p. 291 L. 10 (disallowing recall of R.P but giving more
"latitude" in relation to older victims), and because R.P. offered no testimony
relevant to Count V (see Trial Tr., p. 185, L. 1 - p. 206, L. 19), any error was
necessarily harmless in relation to the conviction on Count V.
Second, the error was also harmless as to the conviction on Count II in
which R.P was the victim.

In order to establish error in relation to a court's

decision to exclude evidence, the "substance of the evidence" must be "made
known to the court by offer" or must be "apparent from the context within which
questions were asked."

I.RE. 103(a)(2).

Thus, it is incumbent on the party

offering evidence to present an offer of proof of the substance of the excluded
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evidence to allow meaningful appellate review. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 730
P.2d 921 (1986); State v. Rauch, 144 Idaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct.
App. 2007) (citing State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 45, 704 P.2d 944, 949 (Ct. App.
1985)).
In this case Pokorney did assert he wished to inquire about "a whole
bunch of stuff' based on some unknown "material" that Pokorney did not bring to
his trial. (Trial Tr., p. 288, Ls. 18-19; p. 289, Ls. 10-11.)

In response to the

court's specific question, "What are you going to ask him about?" (Trial Tr., p.
289, Ls. 11-12), however, Pokorney's only specific response was, 'Tm going to
ask him about his statements that he had his clothes off' (Trial Tr., p. 290, Ls. 24). Thus, Pokorney's offer of proof preserves only the claim that he was not
allowed to impeach R.P. on his trial testimony that his clothes were off.
R.P. did not testify that his clothes were off, however. He testified that he
went to his parents' bed with clothes on but that his pants were "pulled down"
when Pokorney rubbed his genitals on him. (Trial Tr., p. 195, L. 9 - p. 196, L. 3.)
Because R.P. testified only that his pants were pulled down, not that his clothes
were off, Pokorney's offer of proof simply mischaracterized R.P.'s testimony.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that effective impeachment could be
had in relation to this testimony.
In sum, the only testimony Pokorney indicated he wished to impeach was
R.P.'s testimony that he had his clothes off. R.P. never testified that he had his
clothes off, however, only that his pants had been pulled down. Any attempt to
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impeach on this point would not have resulted in an acquittal. Therefore the error
was harmless.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the
district court.

DATED this 2nd day of October, 2012.
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